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Abstract. It is well-known that the legal form adopted by a firm determines the
type of legal responsibility borne by its owners in case of bankruptcy. In this paper
we argue that a firm under a limited liability status should be characterized by a
higher than average bankruptcy probability, which ultimately captures their risk
exposure when output is affected by exogenous shocks. To test this prediction we
extend Lee’s (1976) switching regressions model to a panel dataset of 1313 Spanish
firms from 1990–1994, separating them into corporate and entrepreneurial forms
(with/without limited liability, respectively). We consider both random effects and
fixed effects panel data models, taking into account the potential endogeneity be-
tween risk exposure and the legal form choice. Our results confirm the hypothesis
that firms under limited liability have significant higher risk exposure than firms
under unlimited liability.
JEL Classification: C20, G32, L21
Key words: Limited liability, risk exposure, sample selection, switching regres-
sions, panel data
1 Introduction
Standard economic analysis often presumes that, in absence of relevant ownership-
control conflicts, the ultimate aim of any firm’s manager is to obtain the highest
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possible profit. This approach, which is usually simplified into a maximization
problem with one or more constraints, ignores the fact that a firm’s objective func-
tion is not entirely independent of its ownership structure. In this paper we intend
to show that the firm’s legal form entails relevant implications with respect to the
assignment of the residual rents it generates and, consequently, modifies the incen-
tives of the individuals involved in this maximization process, thus affecting their
subsequent product or labor market decisions.
Our basic argument relies on the well-known relationship between the legal
form adopted by a firm and the type of legal responsibility faced by its owners
in case of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling 1976). When the owners are
stockholders with limited liability over the residual rent, they are at risk for the
firm’s obligations only up to the amount of their initial investments. If some of
the firm’s financing is via debt (to be repaid before the owners get any return on
their investments), they might prefer to make excessively risky decisions rather
than maximize the value of the firm. If business performs well, debtors are paid
their contracted amounts and equity holders retain the remainder. When things go
badly, debt is not repaid in full since creditors can only claim property owned by
the company. Some of the losses are thus shifted onto the debtors; riskier decisions
shift more of the downside onto the debtors and always leave the upside gain to the
stockholders.
There are different legal forms under which private business can be carried
out. For example, as in most other countries, Spanish Corporate Law distinguishes
between two main legal forms: one in which firms have no legal capacity separate
from its owners (non-corporate, individual firms or sole proprietorships), and other
in which firms do have this capacity (corporate firms or societa`rie forms). Charac-
teristic examples of the former are the sole proprietorship (empresa individual) and
the collective association (sociedad colectiva), whereas corporate forms are mostly
limited liability ones (particularly, the sociedad ano´nima, SA, and the sociedad
de responsabilidad limitada, SL). The distinguishing features of all these different
legal forms according to Spanish Corporate Law have been summarized in Table 1.
Since the pioneering work by Berle and Means (1932), a whole strand of the
literature has related a firm’s legal status with its observed real market performance.
Most authors have extensively appealed to the agency theory to explain the rela-
tionship between the ownership structure of an organization and the way in which
operating decisions are made inside.1 We coincide with recent papers on corporate
governance in the analysis of how changes in the ownership structure affect the
firm’s decisions (Shleifer and Vishny 1996), although they usually do not compare
different legal forms, or relate the comparison to tax advantages (Mackie-Mason
and Gordon 1997). We prefer instead a different path. We build a simple model for
the ‘limited liability effect’ described above and test whether a distinct legal status
1 See Demsetz (1983) for a summary of the debate. There also exists an extensive empirical literature
relating the firms’ real behavior with descriptive factors (such as size, R&D, productivity, foreign or
public capital, etc.) including the legal form as one of the explanatory variables (see a recent survey in
Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). Among the few ones with Spanish data that explicitly consider the type
of ownership, it is worth mentioning Farin˜as et al. (1992), Galve´ and Salas (1993) and Merino and Salas
(1995).
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Table 1. Main characteristics of Spanish firms’ legal forms
Type Liability Capital Partners Other characteristics
requirements∗∗
Individual Sole Unlimited No upper or 1 Non-strict accounting
firms proprietorship lower limit (maximum) procedures nor corporate
(SP) governance mechanisms
Full (personal) liability for
the firm’s debt and credits
Corporate Collective Unlimited Ptas. 50 mill. 2–50 Non-strict accounting
firms∗ association (CA) (max.) (maximum) procedures nor corporate
governance mechanims
Participations are not tradable.
Full (personal) liability
Sociedad Limited Ptas. 0,5 mill. 1 Strict accounting procedures
limitada (min.) (minimum) and corporate governance
(SA) mechanisms
Participations are not tradable.
A SL may change its legal
form only to SA or CA
Sociedad Limited Ptas. 10 mill. 1 Strict accounting procedures
ano´nima (min)∗∗∗ (minimum) and corporate governance
(SA) mechanisms
Shares are tradable. Any
SA may change its legal form
only to SL or CA
∗ There are other possible legal forms in Spain, but only apply to a fraction of firms (less than 2%)
and correspondingly, to very specific economic circumstances.
∗∗ Currency equivalence: 1 million pesetas = 6010 Euro (approx.)
∗∗∗ This limit was compulsory by June 30, 1992. All sociedades ano´nimas whose capital was below
it were forced either to increase their capital or to become a SL or a CA.
(firmswith/without limited liability) affects the level of risk exposure to bankruptcy,
measured through the choice of a capital-labor ratio for a given amount of debtwhen
the output is affected by exogenous shocks on productivity.
This analysis contributes to the literature on the limited liability effect started
with a seminal paper by Brander and Lewis (1986), and later extended by Glazer
(1994), Showalter (1995), Maksimovic (1995) and, more recently, Faure-Grimaud
(2000). They all show that the limited liability confers some strategic effects to debt
and may ultimately affect competition in prices, quantities or other real variables.
A number of empirical papers have attempted to prove these effects in different set-
tings. Opler and Titman (1994) investigate whether high-leveraged firms are more
likely to experience performance losses in industry downturns than others. Cheva-
lier (1995a, b) uses supermarket firms’ data to study the effects of LBOs on real
variables. Phillips (1995) and Kovenock and Philips (1995) relate capital structure
to pricing decisions in concentrated industries, andmore recently, Showalter (1999)
finds evidence on the strategic use of debt in limited liability firms for manufac-
turing industries and Campos (2000) extends the analysis to Spanish data. Despite
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all these studies, the empirical tests of the limited liability effect are not conclusive
yet.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the effect of a firm’s chosen
legal form on its level of risk exposure, taking into account that both variables can
be endogenously determined.2 This is the so-called ‘self-selection’ problem, in the
sense that firms make choices of belonging to one group or another on the basis
of unobserved factors that affect outcomes, but are not due to the decision being
evaluated. To address this issue, following Lee (1976), we estimate a switching
regression model with endogenous switch. We extend Lee’s model in two ways.
First, we use panel data, which allows for time invariant unobserved firm-specific
effects that can be correlated with the regressors. In other words, we will allow for
fixed effects, which would be impossible in the cross-section context. The usual
cross-section model imposes independence between individual effects and regres-
sors, which, in a panel data context, leads to the more restrictive random effects
model. In addition, there are two types of fixed effects models that we particularly
consider here: a model in which selectivity only enters through the fixed effects and
amodelwhich incorporatesmore general selectivity effects.We compare the results
from these two models with those from a random effects one. In addition, since any
firm’s performance is also conditioned by its overall characteristics (activity sector,
size, age, location), these elements are also included in the comparison between
the two types of legal forms. Our empirical results show that, for a given capital
structure, there is a significantly different behavior between both types of firms.
Specifically, once the endogeneity between legal form and risk exposure is taken
into account, we confirm the presence of the standard overinvestment problem only
in the limited liability firms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a general
model that shows why real behavior across firms differs according to their owners’
liability status. To illustrate this idea with an example we translate it into a standard
labor market partial equilibrium framework where, for a given capital structure,
limited liability firms tend to assume more risk than their unlimited liability coun-
terparts. More risk is defined in terms of choosing a lower capital-labor ratio and
a lower expected labor productivity, since it will be proved that this implies higher
output variance. Section 3 carries out an empirical analysis of this model to test our
hypothesis about the different behavior of firms according to their liability status.
Section 4 summarizes the main results.
2 A model of limited liability and risk in real decisions
In this section we introduce a simple theoretical framework that relates a firm’s
liability status (definedby its legal form, according to each country’s corporate laws)
with real decisions in the labormarket made tomaximize expected operating profits
in a static setting. The model will be developed in two steps. We will first outline
the general relationship between the limited or unlimited liability statuses with the
2 Our dataset does not allow us to explicitly model the firms’ initial choice of legal form. Turnover,
tax advantages and administrative requirements are usually called for as explanatory variables.
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risk attitude of the firm’s owners. Then, as a particular example of this relationship,
we will relate a firm’s risk attitude with its hiring decisions in a neoclassical, partial
equilibrium, labor market.
2.1 Limited liability and risk attitudes
When a firm is under unlimited personal liability (usually a single-owner firm) there
is no difference between the proprietor’s earnings and the market profits generated
by her firm. By definition, the firm is part of the entrepreneur’s personal estate and
she cannot make distinctions among its elements. The owner, by itself or via debt,
provides the funds needed to keep the firm in operation, then real decisions are
made in order to maximize (expected) profits and, finally, at the end of any period,
positive net earnings automatically increase her personal wealth, whereas negative
earnings automatically decrease it.
This rent allocation is completely different when the firm is a corporation with
limited liability. In this case the owners (namely, shareholders) are only entitled to
a share of profits and to certain control rights to appoint a manager or a board of
directors, who intends to maximize (expected) profits on their appointers’ behalf.3
Positive net earnings imply a payoff to the owners (dividends), but negative ones
are not translated in the same way into their wealth. By law, losses are limited to
the shareholders’ initial contribution so that their personal estate is no longer open
to unsatisfied creditors.
This asymmetry is hampered by corporate law in most countries, introducing
different incentives for real decision-making depending on the firm legal status and
liability. To see this, let E[u(W˜ )] be the firm’s owners’ expected utility, where,
as usual, u(·) functional form defines their risk attitude with respect to final net
wealth. Let us assume the owners are initially risk neutral, so that u(·) is linear, and
therefore by construction:
E
[
u(W˜ )
]
= u
[
E(W˜ )
]
. (1)
Variable W˜ represents any period stochastic net wealth earned by the firm, given by
the difference between operating profit (π˜), which depends on the firms’ operating
decisions, and payments owed to external creditors (D). Then, the owners’ net
wealth at the end of any period will be a transformation of W˜ , that is, W˜U = π˜−D
for unlimited liability firms, or W˜L = max {π˜ − D, 0} for limited liability ones.
In general,we canwrite W˜j = gj(π˜−D), with j = U,L; where gj(·) functional
form now defines the owners’ risk attitude with respect to net operating profits.
Note that gU (·) is linear, so that initial risk neutrality does not change for unlimited
liability firms, whereas gL(·) is convex, so that limited liability firms become risk-
lovers with respect to profits. This result confirms the hypothesis advanced by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that limited liability protection is associated with riskier
3 Since we intend to focus on the limited liability effect, in this simple formulation we ignore
managers-owners conflicts. For simplicity, it is also assumed that no dividends are retained in this
single-period world.
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entrepreneurial activity. In a more recent paper, Asplund (2002) generalizes this
idea to the study of risk-aversion in any oligopoly models.
The change in the owners’ risk attitude with respect to the operating profits
modifies the firm’s real decision when intending to maximize them. This result can
be formally proved by noting that (1) is equivalent to:
E [u (gj (π˜ − D))] = u [E (gj (π˜ − D))] ,
which becomes E[u (gU (π˜ − D))] = u[E(gU (π˜ − D))] = u[gU (E(π˜ − D))] for
unlimited liability firms because gU (·) is linear. Thus, by defining the composite
function fU = u ◦ gU , it results that in this case
E [fU (π˜ − D)] = fU [E (π˜ − D)] ,
and thefirm’s owners are also risk neutralwith respect to operatingprofits. Similarly,
for limited liability firms, expression (1) is equivalent to
E [u (gL (π˜ − D))] = u [E (gL (π˜ − D))] ,
with u[E(gL(π˜−D))] > u[gL(E(π˜−D))] after using Jensen’s inequality and the
fact that u′(·) > 0. Hence,
E [fL (π˜ − D)] > fL [E (π˜ − D)]
where fL = u ◦ gL, and the firm owners become risk lover in profits.
Note that capital structure plays a crucial role in these relationships, since the
amount of debt implicitly defines the bankruptcy probability faced by a firm and,
consequently, the extent towhichowners under limited liability are protected.Under
limited liability, more debt financing involves by definition a higher risk of failure,
the cost of which is not borne by the firm’s owners. Thus, the larger the debt level,
the higher the change in risk attitude in favor of riskier decisions affecting operating
profits.4
To include capital structure decisions in the above results it is required to extend
the model to a previous stage in which firms first make financial decisions and then
decide on the operating variables that ultimately determine the value of π˜. The
model can be formulated as a two-stage game, where sub-game perfect equilibrium
is achieved by backwards induction. Each firm first decide on its real variables for
a given capital structure, and then select in the first stage the amount of debt that
maximizes
E
[
u(W˜ )
]
= E [u(π˜(D) − D)] .
The resulting payoffs are obtained by replacing this optimal debt level (say, D∗)
into the second-stage net profit function. The exact value of D∗ will depend on the
type of strategic interaction among firms, as showed both by Brander and Lewis
(1986) and Faure-Grimaud (2001).
4 This relationship assumes that any other risk source that affects the bankruptcy probability (for
example, aggregate risk at the economy-wide level) does not depend on the firm’s capital structure.
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2.2 Risk attitude and real behavior in the labor market
This subsection presents a simple labor market model that, within a standard partial
equilibrium framework, serves to illustrate the idea that different liability regimes
imply different real behavior among firms. The model, based on a representative
firmwith risk neutral owners, builds on Padilla and Requejo (2000). After choosing
its legal form between a limited or unlimited liability status, our analysis starts by
considering that the firm has access to a production technology which requires
an investment of I > 0 to buy a certain level of capital stock for the period.
The production function yields X(N) units of output if N workers are hired in a
competitive labor market at an exogenous known wage, w, the same for all firms.5
In order to finance the investment, which is larger than the owners’ initial
wealth, the firm issues debt with face value D > 0. Then, the product is sold
in a competitive product market, at an ex-ante uncertain market price,θ˜, which is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed among firms according
to a (twice-continuously differentiable) cumulative distribution function F (·). The
proceeds of the sale minus the wage bill constitute the firm’s operating profits, π˜ =
θ˜X(N) − wN , which are used for debt repayment and shareholders’ rewarding.6
In this short-run setup, thefirm’s problem is just to choose the number ofworkers
to hire in order to maximize the owners’ expected net wealth. We will show that the
results of this decision depend on the legal status of the firm. Thus, for an unlimited
liability firm, the objective function it intends to maximize is
WU = E [π˜ − D] = E
[
θ˜X(N) − wN − D
]
(2)
whose first order condition, given by w = E[θ˜X ′(N)], implies, as usual, that the
firm hires workers until their expected marginal productivity equals the market
wage.
Alternatively, limited liability firms face a different problem. Since their owners
are protected by law in case of financial distress, their expected net wealth is given
by WL = E[max {π˜ − D, 0}], that is
WL = E
[
θ˜X(N) − wN − D
∣∣∣ θ˜ > wN + D
X(N)
]
· Pr
(
θ˜ >
wN + D
X(N)
)
, (3)
where the last part denotes the non-default probability. Therefore, employment is
chosen so that themarket wage equals the expected value of themarginal productiv-
ity of labor conditional on the ex-post value of their claims to the firm’s net wealth
being positive. Hence, the first order condition is now
w = E
[
θ˜X ′(N)
∣∣∣ θ˜ > wN + D
X(N)
]
, (4)
5 The production function also satisfies the standard technical conditions: X(0) = 0, X′(0) > 0,
X′′(0) < 0, limN→0X′(·) = ∞, and limN→∞X′(·) = 0.
6 As pointed out by a referee, the amount of initial debt could be different for limited/unlimited firms
since in a perfect credit market the lenders would anticipate each firm’s behavior. A different debt level,
however, does not change the predictions of the model.
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stating that the employment level is now chosen by setting the market wage equal
to a higher expected marginal productivity. For a given employment level, N , the
set of states of nature (price realizations) considered by limited liability owners is
a strict subset of the set of states considered by unlimited liability ones. Hence,
by concavity of X(·), limited liability results in over-employment and inefficiency
with respect to the unlimited liability case, where the firm simply maximizes its
expected (unconditional) value.
The intuition behind these results, described in Sect. 2.1 above, is the same as in
the well-known ‘over-investment’ problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976), which
Brander and Lewis (1986) translated into the ‘excessive risk shifting’ of the limited
liability effect. Because of this limited liability, the owners’ ex-post valuations of
the firm’s results are convex so that they behave as risk lovers: among those projects
with the same ex-ante value, they would prefer the project with more variability
in its ex-post returns, thus assuming excessive risks. In our model, an increase in
N constitutes a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the firm’s ex-post
returns, since it is immediate to see that
∂E
[
θ˜X(N) − wN
]
∂N
= E
[
θ˜X ′(N) − w
]
= 0,
and
∂Var
[
θ˜X(N) − wN
]
∂N
= 2Var(θ˜)X ′(N) > 0.
Hence, a higher employment level (or, conversely, a lower capital-labor ratio) for
a given capital structure always implies a higher risk exposure.
Finally, the model can be also completed introducing capital structure deci-
sions. The procedure would be similar to that described above, using the value
of the firm as a whole (V ) to determine the optimal debt level issued by each
type of firm in a previous first stage. Thus, by noting that the equilibrium levels
of employment resulting from (2) and (4) are themselves functions of the debt
level, N∗U [D] and N∗L[D], the debt-choice problem becomes the maximization of
Vj = E
[
θ˜X[N∗j (D)] − wN∗j (D)
]
, with j = U ,L. The resulting first order con-
dition,
dVj
dD
= E
[
θ˜X ′(N)
dN∗j
dD
]
− wdN
∗
j
dD
= 0,
confirms that debt plays a role only in limited liability firms since, according to
(2),w = E[θ˜X ′(N)] in unlimited liability ones. Note however that these additional
calculations do not change the main relationship obtained in (4).
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we empirically analyze the relationship between a firm’s legal status
and its risk exposure, according to the predictions of the theoretical framework in
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Table 2. Sample description
Periods in the sample Number of firms Fraction (in %)
1993–1994 (2 years) 74 5.64
1992–1994 (3 years) 47 3.58
1991–1994 (4 years) 28 2.13
1990–1994 (5 years) 1164 88.65
Total 1313 100
Sect. 2. In particular, we estimate how risk exposure differs among Spanish firms,
depending on their legal form, accounting for the fact that both variables could be
jointly determined. To address this particular problem we make use of panel data
techniques, which allow for time invariant unobserved firm-specific effects.
3.1 Data source and sample selection
We use data from the waves 1990-1994 of the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empre-
sariales (ESEE, Spanish Firms’ Strategies Survey) (see Farin˜as and Jaumandreu
1995), which contains complete balance sheets data, employment and product mar-
ket information for 2,595 Spanish manufacturing firms. Our sample is restricted
to private firms with one of the following different legal forms: sole proprietor-
ship (empresa individual) and firms with limited liability (sociedad ano´nima, SA,
and sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, SL). These three legal forms represent
more than 85% of all private firms in the Spanish economy. Public sector and
government-controlled firms are not included in our sample, owing to their special
profit-maximization behavior.7 For the same reason, our final sample also excludes
those firms that were taken over or experienced significant changes in their gov-
ernance structures and firms that divested part of their business units during the
sample period. Furthermore, in order to minimize the incidence of extreme obser-
vations, those firms that modified their legal status more than once in the five-year
period considered have been dropped from the sample. After filtering the sample
we end up with 1,313 firms that at least remained for two consecutive years in the
ESEE. Table 2 shows that most firms in our sample (88.65%) stayed in it for the
whole five-year period considered.8
In order to test the theoretical predictions about the different behavior of firms
according to their liability status, we estimated the effect of having or not limited
liability on two different dependent variables reflecting firm’s risk exposure: labor
productivity and capital-labor ratio. Labor productivity has been defined as the
proportion of earnings before interest, taxes, amortization and the wage bill over
total employment, whereas the capital-labor ratio is defined as the proportion of
7 We also excluded other existing legal forms (labor-managed firms and partnerships) of minor
importance in the Spanish economy because their different governance rules could possibly distort our
results.
8 In order to retain asmany observations as possible, the unbalanced sample design has been preferred
to a balance design. Furthermore, deleting those observations which are not represented in all five years
would introduce a sample selection bias (see Pedersen et al. 1990).
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Table 3. Overview of variables and summary statistics (standard deviations in parenthesis)
Variable Description Mean Mean
(limited liability) (unlimited liability)
Size Number of employees 198.32 (523.6) 17.73 (15.14)
Export/Import Dummy for exports or imports 0.63 (0.48) 0.24 (0.42)
Age1 Dummy for age of the firm between 0–5 0.18 (0.38) 0.11 (0.31)
Age2 Dummy for age of the firm between 6–20 0.42 (0.49) 0.45 (0.49)
Age3 Dummy for age of the firm > 20 0.39 (0.48) 0.43 (0.49)
Control Dummy for coincidence between owner 0.43 (0.49) 0.84 (0.36)
and manager
Quote Dummy for quoting in the Stock exchange 0.03 (0.16) 0
Capital Dummy equals 1 if firm is capital intensive 0.67 (0.46) 0.60 (0.49)
Debt Total debt/Total Assets 0.57 (0.24) 0.44 (0.29)
Loc1 Dummy equals 1 if the firm is located in 0.43 (0.49) 0.38 (0.48)
(rich regions) Baleares, Catalun˜a, Navarra, Madrid,
La Rioja
Loc3 Dummy equals 1 if the firm is located in 0.15 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44)
(poor regions) Andalucı´a, C. La Mancha, Extremadura
Loc2 Dummy equals 1 if the firm is located 0.42 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48)
elsewhere
K/L ratio Capital-labor ratio 5089.07 (76.05) 2047.58 (32.15)
Productivity Labor productivity 4184.86 (29.6) 2709.60 (33.42)
fixed assets over total employment. Limited liability has been defined as a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the firm is SA or SL, and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variables used in the estimation can be classified into two
groups: variables relating the capital structure ratio, and variables representing
several descriptive characteristics of the firm. In the first group we include the
ratio of total debt to total assets. The potential endogeneity of this variable will
be properly taken into account below. In the second group we included a set of
dummy variables reflecting the size and age of the firm, if there is coincidence
between managers and owners, if the firm is capital intensive, if it is quoted in
the stock exchange and if the firm exports or imports. To complete the model
specification, we have included time dummies to control for business cycle effects,
sector dummies to control for industry-wide effects and localization dummies.
Definitions and summary statistics for the main variables are presented in Ta-
ble 3. It can be observed that firms with limited liability hire a larger number of
workers than firms with full liability. This result is not surprising since, by law,
there is a requirement on the number of employees (or indirectly, the turnover size
– see Table 1), in order to create a limited liability corporation. These firms also
have higher labor productivity and capital-labor ratio.
3.2 Econometric models
We consider panel data models that allow for firms’ specific effects, which are
either assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables (random effects), or
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allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables (fixed effects). Our starting
point is the following equation system:
dit = 1(δ′xit + uit ≥ 0)
yi0t = µ0 + β′0xit + ηi + εi0t, if dit = 0 (5)
yi1t = µ1 + β′1xit + ηi + εi1t, if dit = 1
where the indices i and t refer to firm i in period t(t = 1, . . . , T ); dit is a selection
dummy representing the firm’s legal form choice, which is 1 for limited and 0 for
unlimited firms; xit is a vector of explanatory variables; yi0t and yi1t are continuous
variables measuring risk exposure for limited and unlimited liability firms, respec-
tively. Of the two variables, yi0t and yi1t, one is realized and the other is latent.
Finally, ηi is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effect and (uit, εi0t, εi1t)
are the error terms. β1, β0 and δ are vectors of unknown parameters, whereas 1(.)
stands for the usual indicator function.
3.2.1 Random effects
In a random effects model we assume that uit, εi0t, εi1t and ηi are normally dis-
tributed and ηi is independent of the xit vector. Therefore, consistent estimates
of the parameters can be obtained by pooling each wave of data (i.e., each cross-
section). Thus, we can drop the t-subscript and include the random effects into the
error terms, which then become (ui, εi0 + ηi, εi1 + ηi). Subsequently, the relation-
ships in (5) could be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques on the
pooled data if the error terms ui, εi0 + ηi and εi1 + ηi are assumed to be indepen-
dent of the variables in xit, or by instrumental variables (IV) if one of the x (in
our case, debt) is allowed to be endogenous. However, if diand yiare jointly deter-
mined, these methods provide inconsistent estimates of the parameters. Therefore,
in order to consider the simultaneity between risk exposure and liability choice, we
can use standard estimation techniques for a cross-section endogenous switching
regression model.
A detailed analysis of this type of models is given in Lee (1976). Lee’s approach
consists of two steps. The first one is to estimate the pooled binary choice selec-
tion equation by maximum likelihood (a probit model). The second step requires
estimating the risk exposure equations, taking into account the selectivity bias and
the potential endogeneity of debt variables. Selection is accounted for by adding
extra regressors, which can be seen as correction terms. These correction terms are
functions of the index δ’xit, where the δ parameters are replaced by their first round
estimates. For the case of exogenous regressors, OLS estimates with the correction
terms added as additional regressors, lead to consistent estimates of the parameters.
Potential endogeneity of debt can be accounted for by using IV (with its lagged
values as instruments) instead of OLS in the second step.Moreover, since normality
of the errors is assumed, exclusion restrictions are not required. More details on
this estimator have been included in the Appendix.
3.2.2. Fixed effects
The panel structure of our data allows us to relax and test some implicit assumptions
in the cross-section or pooled data analysis. Specifically, the firm specific effects
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can be treated as time-invariant nuisance parameters, which therefore allows for
correlation between fixed effects and regressors. In this case, we explicitly include
the time period in the notation. Estimation is carried out taking differences between
periods t and t−1 in Eq. (5) in order to drop out the fixed effects. The assumptions
regarding the error terms of the differenced model will determine the exact method
of estimation.
If we assume that no selection bias is present after differencing, standard panel
data estimation procedures can be used. Under the assumption of strict exogeneity
of the explanatory variables, consistent estimates of the parameters can be obtained
by OLS regression of the first differenced model, whereas IV on the differenced
model should be applied to account for the potential endogeneity of debt. In these
cases, there is no reason to estimate the auxiliary selection equation and only the
risk exposure equation needs to be estimated. This corresponds to the assumption
that possible selection effects on the risk equation only enters through correlation
between ηi and (ui1,. . . , uiT ).9
A more general model is one in which selection not only enters through the
fixed effect, but selectivity effects remain even after first differencing. In that case,
we estimate a switching regression model forN firms observed T consecutive time
periods. Therefore, this model accounts for the self-selectivity problem, as well
as other forms of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. A two-stage estimation
procedure adding a selectivity correction in the differenced equation yields consis-
tent estimates of the parameters. In this case, the selectivity terms are calculated in
a first step estimating the selection equation for each year separately. As in the pre-
vious case, we can use OLS or IV in the second step depending on the assumption
about the exogeneity of debt (see Appendix for details).
3.3 Results
In this section we report the estimates from the different models described above.
Our basic motivation is to examine two considerations: endogeneity of the legal
form choice and the impact of controlling for correlated time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity.
Results on the selection equation are presented in Table 4. In the first column
we present the probit estimates based on the pooled data for the five waves, which
are used to calculate the selection correction for the random effects model. In the
remaining columns we include the estimates of the selection equation for each of
the waves separately, which are used to calculate the selection correction for the
fixed effects model. The results for the five waves are quite similar to each other
and the estimates based on the pooled data are always in range of the estimates
based on the separate waves. Standard errors are lower that those for the five waves
separately and all pooled estimates are significant at the 5% level. The conclusions
do not change. We find that the probability of choosing limited liability increases
with size. The export/import effect is also positive, while the age of the firm has a
9 This assumption has been previously used in the study of Pedersen et al. (1990) onwage differentials
between public and private sector.
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Table 4. Legal form choice (selection equation)
Independent variables Pooled, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994,
probit probit probit probit probit probit
Size 0.897 1.016 0.506 0.837 0.522 0.428
(4.21) (2.23) (1.51) (1.86) (0.23) (0.32)
Control −0.966 −1.543 −0.761 −1.149 −1.044 −0.382
(−10.32) (−7.72) (−4.12) (−4.70) (−3.90) (−1.77)
Export/Import 0.801 0.994 0.839 0.779 0.693 1.046
(9.26) (4.51) (4.57) (4.08) (3.47) (4.63)
Age2 −0.376 −0.097 −0.317 −0.550 −0.333 −0.732
(−3.25) (−0.39) (−1.37) (−1.99) (−1.19) (−2.02)
Age3 −0.860 −0.822 −0.729 −1.002 −1.005 −1.183
(−6.83) (−2.89) (−2.85) (−3.31) (−3.40) (−3.10)
Loc1 0.293 0.289 0.279 0.457 0.343 0.091
(2.89) (1.22) (1.35) (2.00) (1.37) (0.34)
Loc2 0.188 0.283 0.208 0.363 0.135 −0.133
(1.90) (1.19) (1.00) (1.65) (0.58) (−0.52)
Year 1991 0.285
(2.50)
Year 1992 0.398
(3.39)
Year 1993 0.586
(4.80)
Year 1994 0.632
(5.09)
Constant 2.930 3.289 2.813 3.247 7.977 7.771
(9.95) (5.20) (5.32) (5.59) (10.07) (11.49)
Log-Likelihood −673.97 −126.37 −159.67 −138.115 −117.44 −104.79
No of observations 6,221 1,164 1,192 1,239 1,313 1,313
Dependent variable: Dummy equals 1 if the firm has limited liability and 0 otherwise.
Sector dummies included. Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios.
negative effect. As expected, being the owner and the manager of the firm decreases
the probability of limited liability. Regional dummies imply that limited liability
is higher in other regions that in the poorest ones, where individual firms are more
likely. Estimates based on the pooled data include time dummies for each wave.
The estimates for the time dummies show that the probability of choosing limited
liability increases over the sample period considered, ceteris paribus.
Results on the risk exposure equations are presented in Tables 5 and 6, which
contain the results for the random effects and fixed effects models without and
with correction for selection. The estimated standard errors take into account het-
eroskedasticity. In all cases, the debt endogeneity possibility has been considered,
being instrumented with its lagged values.10 The models are estimated on the un-
balanced sample of 1,239 firms that were observed over three or more periods.
The reason is that in order to account for the possible debt endogeneity, for the
random effects models we use lagged values of debt as instruments (lagged one
10 The cases without and with time and sector dummies were tested. Since these dummies turned out
to be insignificant, we only report the estimation results without them.
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Table 5. Risk exposure estimates. Random effects
Productivity Capital-Labor ratio
Pooled IV Pooled switching, IV Pooled IV Pooled switching, IV
Limited 1.344 (3.80) −10.618 (−2.34) 0.612 (0.64) −6.483 (−2.33)
Total debt/Total assets −2.131 (−3.97) −1.546 (−2.50) −2.817 (−2.06) −2.093 (−4.75)
Control −0.638 (−3.66) −0.200 (−1.07) −2.344 (−5.72) −1.254 (−5.55)
Export/Import 0.637 (3.21) 0.627 (2.59) −0.116 (−0.24) −0.447 (−0.13)
Age2 −0.205 (−0.81) 0.310 (1.19) −1.751 (−1.47) −0.047 (−0.13)
Age3 −0.028 (−0.10) 0.822 (2.61) −0.941 (−0.73) −1.093 (−0.15)
Loc2 −0.188 (−1.0) −0.018 (−0.08) 0.635 (1.18) 0.498 (2.47)
Loc3 0.265 (0.72) 0.486 (1.21) 0.385 (0.50) 0.920 (1.88)
Size 1.242 (4.44) 0.614 (2.07) 2.459 (3.81) 0.885 (1.83)
Quote 0.468 (0.73) 6.315 (4.16) 6.178 (1.59) 0.920 (0.40)
Capital 0.899 (6.34) 0.815 (5.35) 5.187 (16.44) 3.931 (21.71)
Constant 3.071 (6.13) 14.015 (3.03) 6.099 (3.69) 9.994 (3.38)
σ1u − σ0u 9.869 (6.81) 7.281 (5.95)
AdjustedR2 0.2601 0.3337 0.2953 0.3475
Number of observations: 3,595. Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. In IV estimation Total debt/Total
assets in t − 1 and t − 2 are used as instruments.
and two periods), which requires three successive observations of each firm.11 In
the fixed effects models, the inclusion of first differenced explanatory variables
makes debt dated t−1 a not valid instrument. Therefore, debt dated t−2 is used in
this case as instrument to obtain consistent estimates under the assumption of debt
endogeneity.12
3.3.1. Random effects estimates
Table 5 reports the results from the pooled data without and with selection correc-
tion. The first two columns correspond to the labor productivity dependent variable
and the last two ones correspond to the capital-labor ratio dependent variable. We
considered cases in which debt is assumed to be exogenous and it is allowed to be
endogenous. We tested exogeneity of debt by means of Hausman-type tests, based
on the difference between pooled OLS and IV estimates both for the model which
treats limited liability as an exogenous variable and for the model which accounts
for selectivity. The realization of the test statistics ranges from 20.24 – 43.73, which
is always higher than the critical value of a χ2 distribution with twelve and thirteen
degrees of freedom respectively at 5%. We thus only report the estimation results
accounting for the endogeneity of debt. Standard error of debt is higher when it is
instrumented and its coefficient is lower in absolute value, although always nega-
tive. Regarding the remaining variables, our conclusions do not changewith respect
to the models that consider debt as an exogenous variable.
Pooled IV (2SLS) estimates show that firms with limited liability have higher
labor productivity and capital-labor ratio than the rest of firms, although the latter
is not statistically significant. This result seems to contradict our theoretical predic-
11 Since debt does not play any role in the selection equation, observations with missing information
of debt lagged two periods are also used in the selection equation.
12 The use of additional debt lags does not change the results, whereas reduces the number of obser-
vations.
14
tions. However, once the endogeneity of the legal form choice is accounted form,
we find that the risk exposure is significantly lower for firms that enjoy limited
liability. This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction about the overin-
vestment problem associated with limited liability. The gap between the two types
of estimates shows the importance of accounting for unobserved characteristics that
might affect the risk exposure choice but are not due to the legal form adopted.
To test the hypothesis that simultaneity does exist, we test σ1u − σ0u = 0. We
find that this coefficient is significant, which implies that simultaneity does occur.
Moreover, a very important issue concerns the sign of these covariances. As pointed
out by Trost (1981), if self-selection is based on comparative advantage, that is, if all
firms who are faced with the choice between two regimes choose the regime which
yields a maximum value, then the expected relationship between the covariances
is σ0u < σ1u and σ0u and σ1u can have any signs. If σ0u < σ1u it means that
the expected unlimited result (in terms of risk exposure) of the unlimited firms
will be greater than the expected result of the unlimited firms if they were to have
limited liability. Furthermore, it will also be true that the expected limited result
of the limited firms will be grater than the expected result of the limited firms if
they were to have unlimited liability (see Appendix for a detailed discussion of this
point). In our case, this expected relationship holds both for the productivity and
capital-labor ratio equations. So the estimates are consistent with the comparative
advantage hypothesis.
3.3.2 Fixed effects estimates
Estimation results for the fixed effects models are included in Table 6, both under
the assumption that legal form is exogenous (first differences estimates), and al-
lowing for its endogeneity (switching regression of the first differenced model). As
in the random effects estimates, estimation both under the assumption that debt is
exogenous (OLS on the differenced model) and allowing for its endogeneity (IV on
the differenced model) has been performed. Again, Hausman-type test comparing
these two leads to rejecting exogeneity in all cases except in the models for the
capital-labor ratio equation.13 Therefore, in these cases debt has not been instru-
mented. In general, as in Table 5, the effect of accounting for the debt endogeneity is
that estimated parameters are somewhat smaller in absolute value and the standard
errors are higher.14
We observe that, in all cases and according to our theoretical predictions, there
is a negative effect of limited liability on the risk choice by the firm, although no
significant effect is found with regards to the capital-labor ratio dependent variable.
Moreover, relative to the rest of estimates, the first differencing estimates show
a downward bias (in absolute value) in the coefficient of limited liability. This
result is unsurprising, since the first differencing estimator controls for correlated
unobserved heterogeneity, but in doing so we would expect it to introduce biases
due to lack of strict exogeneity of the legal form explanatory variable. Again, the
null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the disturbances in the risk
13 In this case, the value of the χ2 with twelve degrees of freedom is 13.15, with a p-value of 35.81%.
14 When debt is instrumented we obtain a negative effect of this variable on the capital-labor ratio
equation, although this effect is non significant.
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Table 6. Risk exposure estimates. Fixed effects
Productivity Capital-Labor ratio
First differencing, IV Switching, IV First differencing Switching
Limited −3.342 (−5.89) −3.733 (−2.04) −0.571 (−0.26) −0.705 (−0.50)
Total debt/Total assets −0.313 (−1.43) −2.300 (−2.87) 1.235 (2.18) 1.926 (2.30)
Control −0.153 (−1.57) −0.306 (−2.50) −0.038 (−0.17) −0.334 (−2.05)
Export/Import 0.073 (0.56) 0.273 (1.71) −0.215 (−0.73) −0.196 (−1.11)
Age2 −0.141 (−0.85) −0.361 (−1.51) 0.329 (0.82) −0.023 (−0.14)
Age3 −0.224 (−0.83) −0.319 (−0.85) 0.692 (1.14) 0.076 (0.24)
Loc2 0.739 (1.20) 0.067 (0.07) 0.626 (0.44) −0.050 (−0.16)
Loc3 0.778 (1.16) 0.202 (0.42) 1.421 (0.72) 0.627 (1.79)
Size −2.828 (−7.97) −2.647 (−2.40) −3.213 (−4.18) −0.007 (−0.03)
Quote −0.446 (−1.01) 0.878 (5.21) −0.927 (−1.03) 0.878 (0.58)
Capital 0.159 (1.42) 0.018 (0.15) 1.522 (5.58) 1.073 (10.21)
σ1u − σ0u – 9.772 (2.45) – 2.172 (1.53)
AdjustedR2 0.1099 0.1554 0.0984 0.1215
Number of observations: 3,595. Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. In IV estimation Total
debt/Total assets in period t − 2 is used as instrument.
exposure equations and the selection equation (that is, σ1u − σ0u = 0) is rejected,
and the models are consistent with the comparative advantage hypothesis, albeit
the evidence for the capital-labor ratio model is weak.
To test the assumption of no correlation between the firm specific effects and the
explanatory variables, we perform a Hausman test based on the difference between
the random effects and the fixed effects estimates in Tables 5 and 6. The resulting
values for the test statistics is at least 238.89. This exceeds the critical χ211 and χ212
values at conventional significance levels, indicating that the random effects panel
data model that does not allow for correlation between firm specific effects and the
explanatory variables is misspecified.
Regarding the comparison between fixed and random effects estimates that
account for self-selection, it turns out that the estimates of the coefficients are
upward biased in absolute value when correlated fixed effects are not considered.
Comparing the results from the last columns in Tables 5 and 6, we can see that the
failure in controlling for fixed effects overestimates the negative effect of limited
liability in the risk exposure of the firms.
4 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper has been to illustrate an empirical relationship
between firms’ legal status and their real behavior. For that purpose, we extend the
usual link derived from the standard theory of risk exposure borne by the firms’
owners to an empirical study that highlights several facts about Spanish firms’ legal
form and its connection with their real activity.
Consistent with the hypothesis we derived from a theoreticalmodel based on the
limited liability effect, we have empirically showed that firms under limited liability
have significant lower labor productivity and lower capital-labor ratio than firms
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under unlimited liability. That is, we observe the standard overinvestment problem
associated to the limited liability status. However, we only obtain this empirical
result when we specifically account in our regressions for the endogeneity between
legal form and risk exposure and/or for existence of unobserved heterogeneity.
We have estimated a switching regression model for panel data, which has en-
abled us to take into account the self-selection bias as well as other forms of time
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Our results indicate that the legal form choice
is endogenous to the risk exposure adopted by the firm. Our analysis, using panel
data information, also reveals the importance of accounting for unobserved time
invariant specific effects correlated with the explanatory variables: our overall con-
clusion is that standard models with random effects and models which only allow
for selection through the fixed effects, are too restrictive. Finally, we have identi-
fied two types of bias not previously addressed by the literature: (i) a downwards
bias induced by the exogeneity assumptions of the legal form choice; and (ii) an
upwards bias due to ignoring time invariant firm effects which are correlated with
the explanatory variables.
Appendix
Here we discuss some details of implementing the estimators which take selection
into account, discussed in Sect. 3.
Random effects. The random effects model for one cross-section can be written as
yi0 = µ0 + β′0xi + vi0, if di = 0
yi1 = µ1 + β′1xi + vi1, if di = 1
(A.1)
where vi0 = εi0 + ηi, vi1 = εi1 + ηi and E(vi0) = E(vi1) = 0. Compared
to the notation in Sect. 3, the time index t is omitted and the random effects are
incorporated into the error terms, which are independent of xi. Variables yi0 and
yi1 indicate the risk exposure outcome if di equals 0 or 1, respectively. Hence the
effect of having limited liability for firm i will be given by the difference yi1–yi0. It
measures how the risk exposure would vary with the legal form if legal form were
not self-selected, but exogenously assigned. It is now useful to rewrite previous
equation as follows
yi = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)di + β′0xi + (β1 − β0)′xidi (A.2)
+(vi0 + (vi1 − vi0)di)
Taking conditional expectations, and since E(vi0)= 0, we have:
E (yi|xi) = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)E (di|xi) + β′0xi (A.3)
+(β1 − β0)′ xiE (di|xi) + g(xi)E (di|xi) ,
where g(xi) = E (vi1|xi, di = 1) − E (vi0|xi, di = 1).
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From (A.3) it is clear that the problem with OLS estimation is that
E(vi0|xi, di = 1) = 0 and E(vi1|xi, di = 1) = 0 because of the self-selection.
Therefore, the OLS regression of y on d gives inconsistent estimates of the param-
eters. In order to obtain the true causal effect of d on y we specify a reduced form
probit for d, that is, di = 1 (δ′xi + ui ≥ 0), where vi0,vi1 and ui are assumed to
have a tri-variate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix:
Σ =

σ0 σ01 σ0uσ1 σ1u
1

 .
The estimation by maximum likelihood methods of the previous model could
be very cumbersome, since it involves the evaluation of multiple integrals. For that
reason, following Lee (1976), we use a simple two-stage estimation method, which
gives estimates that are consistent. Since g(xi) is unobservable, what we have to
do is to obtain the expected values of the residuals vi1 and vi0. The assumption of
joint normality allows us to write15
E (vi1|xi, di = 1) = σ1u φ (δ
′xi)
Φ (δ′xi)
,
and similarly for vi0,
E (vi0|xi, di = 1) = σ0u φ (δ
′xi)
Φ (δ′xi)
,
where φ and Φ are the density function and the distribution function of the standard
normal evaluated at δ′xi. Then, we can write Eq. (A.3) as a regression model:
yi = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)Φi + β′0xiΦi (A.4)
+(β1 − β0)′xiΦi + (σ1u − σ0u)φi + ξi,
where φi = φ(δ′xi), Φi = Φ(δ′xi), and E(ξi) = 0. The two-stage estimation pro-
cedure consists of (i) using the probit model we get maximum likelihood estimates
of δ, and (ii) using these, we get estimated values of φi and Φi. Thus, regressing
yi on a constant, xi, φi and Φi and the interaction variables xiΦi we get consistent
estimates of σ1u − σ0u and the rest of parameters.
Since we have more than one cross-section, we estimate the parameters in the
random effects panel data model by pooling each wave of data and applying the
previous estimation technique to the pooled data. The estimation of the selection
equation is also based on the pooled sample, including time dummies as additional
regressors.16
Note that one of the parameters of main interest for us is (µ1 − µ0), that is, the
differential effect of the dummy variable indicating the legal form.Moreover, in the
previous specification the effect of x varies among firms with different values for d.
15 See Maddala (1983) and references therein for details.
16 Time dummies were also included in the risk exposure equation, but these turned out to be insignif-
icant.
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Estimation of Eq. (A.4) allows us to test which coefficients are different in β1and
β0. Since some of the interaction terms xΦ may be insignificant, this procedure
enables us to implicitly impose restrictions on the equality on some coefficients
between the regression coefficients in the two regimes.17
The identification of the parameters of the model relies on the distributional
assumption about the process generating risk exposure and legal form outcomes.
That is to say, assuming that the disturbances are distributed tri-variate normal
is enough to identify the model and it is not strictly necessary the presence of a
regressor in the legal choice equation that does not affect the risk exposure variable.
The interpretation of the covariance terms σ1u and σ0u plays a crucial role in
the discussion of selectivity bias. For that purpose, it is useful to write Eq. (A.3) as
E(yi1 |xi, di = 1) = µ1 + β′1xi + σ1u
φ (δ′xi)
Φ (δ′xi)
, (A.5)
and
E(yi0 |xi, di = 0) = µ0 + β′0xi − σ0u
φ (δ′xi)
1 − Φ (δ′xi) , (A.6)
As pointed out by Trost (1981), if firms choose the regime which is a maximum
(comparative advantage hypothesis), the only necessary condition for consistency
of the model is that σ1u > σ0u, but σ1u and σ0u can be either sign.18 For example,
one case might be that σ1u > 0, σ0u > 0 but with the additional restriction that
σ1u > σ0u. Hence, if σ1u > 0, this means that E(yi1 |xi, di = 1) > µ1 + β′1xi
and E(yi1 |xi, di = 0) < µ1 + β′1xi, that is, the expected productivity of those
firms actually choosing limited liability is greater than µ1 + β1x, and the expected
productivity of those who do not choose limited liability is less than µ1+β1x. Sim-
ilarly, if σ0u > 0, then E(yi0 |xi, di = 1) > µ0 + β′0xi and E (yi0 |xi, di = 0) <
µ0 + β′0xi. Therefore, the limited liability group “dominates” in both productivity
equations. However, since σ1u > σ0u, although those who choose limited liability
are better than average in both limited and unlimited regimes, they are still better
in limited than in unlimited,
E (yi1 |xi, di = 1) > E (yi0 |xi, di = 1)
Furthermore, it will also be true that those who choose unlimited are below average
in both limited and unlimited regimes, but they are better in unlimited than in
limited,
E(yi0 |xi, di = 0) > E(yi1 |xi, di = 0)
Note that estimating Eq. (A.4), using all observations on y, let us estimate σ1u−σ0u
directly. Thus, the estimation of (A.4) is more convenient than separate estimation
of (A.5) and (A.6).
17 In fact, in the empirical specification, we considered cases with and without different β1and β0.
Since the differences turned out to be insignificant, we only report estimation results imposingβ1 = β0.
18 Note that the signs of the covariances are opposite from those presented in Trost (1981) or Maddala
(1983) because the selection equation in this paper is written with a positive disturbance, and with a
negative one in theirs.
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Fixed effects. We can extend the previous approach to the case of fixed effects
models, in which the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity among firms can be
correlated with the explanatory variables. In order to deal with the endogeneity
problem controlling for fixed effects, we consider a switching regression model
for N firms observed T consecutive time periods. Using simultaneously more than
one wave for estimation requires that we explicitly include the time period in the
notation:
yit = µ0 + (µ1 − µ0)Φ (δ′xit) + β′0xit (A.7)
+(β1 − β0)′xitΦ (δ′xit) + (σ1u − σ0u)φ (δ′xit) + ηi + ξit,
If we were to assume that η is uncorrelated with each x,we could apply pooled
switching regression estimators, as we covered in previous section. If η is corre-
lated with any element of x,then the pooled estimator is biased and inconsistent.
Therefore, we can take differences on Eq. (A.7) to eliminate the time-constant un-
observable η:
∆yit = (µ1 − µ0)∆Φ (δ′xit) + β′0∆xit (A.8)
+(β1 − β0)′∆xitΦ (δ′xit) + (σ1u − σ0u)∆φ (δ′xit) + ∆ξit,
which is just a linear model with selectivity correction terms in the differences of all
variables. Similarly to the cross-section case, consistent estimates of the parameters
can be obtained by a two-stage estimation procedure on Eq. (A.8). In this case, the
selectivity terms are calculated in a first step estimating the selection equation for
each year separately. Thus, these terms are differenced along with everything else.
Interpretation of the coefficients of the model and the selectivity correction terms
previously presented are also valid for the fixed effects model.
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